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I employ a large set of scanner price data collected in retail stores to document that (i) 
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fluctuations much larger than those in standard menu costs economies. 
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 1. Introduction
It has been well documented, using both survey evidence, but also direct observation, that
individual goods prices are sticky. The latest major piece of evidence supporting the notion that
prices adjust sluggishly is a study by Bils and Klenow (2004) who ﬁnd, based on a dataset of
prices collected by the BLS, that half of the consumer goods prices in the US economy adjust less
frequently than every 4.3 months. Whether these ﬁrm-level rigidities have important macroeconomic
implications is however still an open question.
Most recent work analyzing the consequences of nominal rigidities assumes that ﬁrms em-
ploy ad-hoc policy rules and does not explicitly model the source of price stickiness. These, time-
dependent models postulate that the timing of price changes is exogenous and unresponsive to the
state of the world. Information-gathering costs or institutional restrictions are presumed to give
rise to this behavior, but these frictions are, with a few exceptions1, rarely modeled. The fact that
these models lack micro-foundations makes them inappropriate for the study of many interesting
policy questions, but also reduces the number of dimensions along which the theory can be tested.
Recently the profession has witnessed a growing interest in an alternative class of models
in which agents solve fully-speciﬁed problems and nominal rigidities arise endogenously, due to
ﬁxed physical (menu) costs of changing prices. These, state-dependent or (S,s) pricing models
can be traced back to the work of Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983), but only
recent advances in numerical solution techniques have enabled researchers to study dynamic, general
equilibrium versions of these economies. Their aggregate implications are, nevertheless, not well
understood. In particular, the ability of ﬁrm-level nominal rigidities to generate business cycle
ﬂuctuations from nominal shocks crucially depends in these models on the distributional assumptions
made to aggregate the economy.
1See Bonomo and Carvalho (2005) and the references therein.
1The predictions of menu-cost models range from stark neutrality2 to cases in which the
economy is virtually indistinguishable from time-dependent setups3. Golosov and Lucas (2004)
study the properties of a model with ﬁrm-level disturbances capable to match the fact that the
magnitude of price changes is large in the US economy: 10% on average, much larger than what
can be explained by aggregate shocks alone. They ﬁnd that the model produces very little output
volatility from monetary shocks, a result similar in spirit to that of Caplin and Spulber (1987).
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) reach an opposite conclusion. They document that there is little
evidence of across-ﬁrm synchronization in the US price data, contrary to what standard menu-
cost models predict. They ﬁnd that a model with time-varying costs of price adjustment that can
replicate this feature of the data behaves identically to a time-dependent sticky price model and
produces large output variability from monetary shocks.
This paper revisits the question of whether menu costs of price adjustment can, in fact,
generate a monetary transmission mechanism. I argue that a truly micro-founded model must be
rendered consistent with the price adjustment practices observed at the ﬁrm level before one can
proceed to study its aggregate predictions. I start by documenting several salient micro-economic
features that characterize ﬁrm pricing behavior. To this end, I employ a large set of scanner price
data collected in a number of grocery stores over a twelve-year period. In addition to the large
frequency and magnitude of price changes, documented by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), I document
two additional features of the data. First, a large number of non-zero price changes are small in
absolute value. Second, the distribution of price changes, conditional on adjustment, exhibits excess
kurtosis.
These two facts seem, at a ﬁrst glance, inconsistent with menu-cost models. Firms that face
2Caplin and Spulber (1987), Golosov and Lucas (2004), a version of the model of Gertler and Leahy (2005).
3Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), another calibration of the model in Gertler and Leahy (2005). See also Burstein
(2003), Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), Danziger (1999), Caplin and Leahy (1991) for studies that explore the
consequences of ﬁxed costs of resetting prices.
2ﬁxed costs of adjustment only reprice when the losses from not doing so are large, and thus tend
to adjust prices by large amounts. As Lach and Tsiddon (2005) argue, however, extensions of the
model to a multi-product setting in which ﬁrms face interactions in the costs of price adjustment
of various goods4 can explain the large number of small price changes. Consider for example, the
problem of a restaurant whose prices are quoted on a single menu. If a single item on the menu is
subject to a large idiosyncratic shock and needs repricing, the restaurant might ﬁnd it optimal to
pay the ﬁxed cost and reprint the menu. Conditional on having payed this ﬁxed cost, changing any
other price on the menu is costless: the restaurant will the reprice all its other items, even if some
need only small price changes.
If economies of scale in the technology of adjusting prices of multi-product ﬁrms are indeed
the source of the large number of small price changes observed in the data, one should observe that
prices of goods within a store adjust in tandem. I extend the evidence of Lach and Tsiddon (1996)
for data collected in Israel and show, using a discrete choice model of a store’s price adjustment
practices, that within-store synchronization is indeed a pervasive feature of the micro-price data.
Prices of goods in narrow product categories, as well as those produced by a given manufacturer,
tend to adjust simultaneously, even after controlling for the e&ect of wholesale price changes and
aggregate marginal cost disturbances that might trigger concomitant adjustment.
I next formulate, calibrate and quantitatively study the properties of a model in which a
two-product ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed cost of changing its entire menu of prices, but, conditional on paying
this cost, zero additional costs of resetting any given price on the menu. I calibrate the distribution
of idiosyncratic technological disturbances, the size of the ﬁxed costs of price adjustment, as well as
the persistence of the technology processes, by requiring the model to accord with the features of
the data enumerated above. I ﬁnd that the model, because of its ability to replicate this additional
4See also Sheshinski and Weiss (1992).
3set of micro-economic facts, can generate aggregate ﬂuctuations of the same magnitude as in time-
dependent economies.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that the main reason standard state-
dependent models with idiosyncratic marginal cost shocks5 under-perform their time-dependent
counterparts is the fact that the identity of adjusters in models with menu costs varies endoge-
nously in response to aggregate disturbances6. Most ﬁrms that adjust in times of, say, a monetary
expansion, are ﬁrms whose incentive to increase prices arising from the aggregate disturbance is
reinforced by an idiosyncratic cost shock that triggers a desired price change in the same direction.
This ‘selection’ e&ect ensures that the aggregate price level is much more responsive to nominal
shocks than in time-dependent models in which the timing of price changes is exogenous. I ﬁnd,
however, that matching the excess kurtosis of price changes and the large number of small price
changes observed in the data requires that technology cost shocks be highly leptokurtic. This feature
of the calibration, as well as the fact that some price changes arise independently of the state of
the world, because of the multi-product aspects of the model, reduces the role of self-selection and
therefore the responsiveness of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks.
A second reason the state-dependent model produces business cycle ﬂuctuations of similar
magnitude as those in time-dependent models is a property of menu-cost economies that has received
little attention in earlier work. One feature of all sticky price models is front-loading of ﬁrm prices
in response to future expected increases in marginal costs. If monetary disturbances are persistent,
a monetary expansion today is expected to be followed by additional increases of the money stock
in future periods. Forward-looking ﬁrms take these forecasts into account and respond stronger to
5Golosov and Lucas (2004), Danziger (1999).
6A second feature characteristic to menu cost models are endogenous ﬂuctuations in the fraction of adjusters in
response to aggregate disturbances, a feature that, as Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) observe, is absent in the data.
Golosov and Lucas (2004) point out, however, that models with marginal cost shocks volatile enough to account for
the large magnitude of price changes observed in the data generate little across-ﬁrm synchronization.
4the nominal shock than they would otherwise in a static world. I show in this paper that front-
loading in response to future disturbances is mainly a feature of time-dependent models: ﬁrms in
a state-dependent world are less willing to forego current proﬁts in order to ensure that expected
future changes in marginal costs are reﬂected in the current price of the ﬁrm. Intuitively, when a
state-dependent ﬁrm ﬁnds itself with a suboptimal price in a future period, it has the option to pay
the menu cost and reprice: it’s losses are bounded therefore by the size of the menu cost. In contrast,
a time-dependent ﬁrm pays dearly every time its price is suboptimal: because it has to wait for an
exogenously ﬁxed number of periods before it gets to reset its price, it will incur much larger losses
from a suboptimal price relative to what a state-dependent ﬁrm would. A time-dependent ﬁrm’s
incentive to o&set future deviations of its price from the optimum is therefore larger than that of a
state-dependent ﬁrm and it adjusts more aggressively in response to persistent shocks to the growth
rate of the money supply.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data used in the empirical work, and
documents its salient features. Section 3 presents results of ordered discrete choice models in which
I provide evidence of within-store synchronization of price changes. Section 4 discusses the model
economy. Section 5 quantitatively evaluates its performance. Section 6 concludes. Appendices
discuss the non-linear solution techniques used to solve the functional equations that characterize
the equilibrium of the model economy and several aspects of the data.
2. Data
I conduct inference using two sources of publicly available sets of scanner price data, main-
tained by the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business7.
The ﬁrst dataset was assembled by AC Nielsen and consists of daily observations on the purchas-
ing practices of a panel of households in Sioux Falls (South Dakota) and Springﬁeld (Missouri). I
7The data is available online at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/index.shtml
5use this household level data to construct a panel of weekly price series spanning more than two
years (January 1985 to March 1987), 31 stores and 115 products in six di&erent product categories
(ketchup, tuna, margarine, peanut butter, sugar and toilet tissue)8.
The second source of data is a by-product of a randomized pricing experiment conducted by
the Dominick’s Finer Foods retail chain in cooperation with the Chicago GSB. Nine years (1989
to 1997) of weekly store level data on the prices of more than 4500 products for 86 stores in the
Chicago area are available. The products available in this database range from non-perishable
foodstu&s (frozen and canned food, cookies, crackers, juices, sodas, beer), to various household
supplies (detergents, softeners, bathroom tissue), as well as pharmaceutical and hygienic products.
I discuss, in the data appendix, several aspects regarding the construction of price series. In
particular, I time-aggregate weekly data into monthly observations in order to calculate statistics
that can be used to evaluate the performance of a model economy in which the length of the period
is a month. For Dominick’s data, which sets prices on a chain-wide basis, I construct a chain-wide
price using the price of the store that has the least number of missing observations for a particular
good. Following Golosov and Lucas (2004), I ﬁlter out temporary price cuts (sales) that last less
than four weeks. I could alternatively incorporate into the model some of the frictions that have
been proposed to explain this pattern of retail price variation9, but this would increase the model’s
complexity considerably, without producing additional insights. In particular, none of the empirical
facts I am about to document are an artifact of my decision to purge the data of sales and time-
aggregate the data.
8The actual number of observations is larger in the original dataset, but I discard stores/goods with a large number
of missing observations. The criteria for inclusion in the sample are discussed in the appendix.
9Informational frictions on consumer’s side of the market (Varian 1980), demand uncertainty (Lazear 1986), or
thick-market explanations (Warren and Barsky, 1995), to name a few.
6A. The Size and Frequency of Price Changes
Figure 1 presents histograms of the distribution of price changes, log
³
pt
pt1
´
, conditional
on adjustment, for the two sets of data, pooled across all goods/stores/months in each sample. I
truncate these distributions, by eliminating the top and bottom 1% of observations, in order to
ensure that results are not driven by outliers. Superimposed on each histogram is the density of a
normal distribution with the same mean and variance as that of the distribution of price changes10.
Table 1 reports moments of these distributions, again computed using the truncated sample of
observations. Several facts emerge in the data.
Fact 1: A large number of price changes are small in absolute value.
Consistent with the evidence presented by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), the average size of
price changes is large11: stores in the AC Nielsen data adjust prices by 10.4% on average, while
those in Dominick’s sample do so by 7.7%. Notice however, in Figure 1, that a large number of
price changes are close to zero. I deﬁne, in the data and in the model of the next section, a “small”
price change as any price change whose magnitude is less than one-half of the mean of the absolute
value of price changes in the data. Roughly 30% of price changes in both datasets are below this
cuto& (5.2% and 3.8%, respectively) in both datasets of prices I work with.
Fact 2: The distribution of price changes exhibits excess kurtosis.
Notice, in Figure 1, that the number of price changes in the vicinity of zero is greater than
that predicted by a normal distribution, while the tails are fatter than those of a normal. As Table
1 indicates, the kurtosis of price changes is 3.5 and 5.4, respectively, larger than that of a Gaussian
distribution12.
10The histogram is scaled so that its cumulative density is also equal to 1.
11The excessive volatility of individual goods’ prices has also been documented for countries other than the US. See
Dhyne et. al (2005) for a survey of ﬁndings from studies of European micro-price data.
12Kurtosis is deﬁned as the ratio of the fourth central moment to the square of the variance. The kurtosis of the
normal according to the convention I employ is then equal to 3.
7Fact 3: Prices in grocery stores change frequently.
Table 2 presents an additional set of facts that I will use below in order to calibrate the
model. It has been widely documented13 that prices in retail stores adjust frequently. The two
datasets I employ here are no exceptions. Despite the fact that I overestimate the duration of price
spells by aggregating weekly data to monthly and eliminating a large number of temporary price
cuts, the average price spell lasts 4 months in the AC Nielsen data and 5.2 months in the case of
Dominick’s prices.
Fact 4: Price changes are transitory.
Let ˆ pt be the price (in logs) of a good in period t, expressed in deviations from a time trend.
If marginal cost shocks are transitory, one would expect two observations of the ﬁrm’s price, ˆ pt,
su^ciently distant in time, to lie close to each other. In contrast, if shocks are highly persistent,
the ﬁrm’s price wonders away from the mean, and di&ers considerably from the price the ﬁrm has
set in the past. Let
Dk =
1
N(Gk)
T P
t;Gk
|ˆ pt  ˆ ptk|
1
N(Ga)
T P
t;Ga
|ˆ pt  ˆ pt1|
be the mean absolute di&erence in a good’s (detrended) price in periods that are k-months apart,
relative to the average absolute value of non-zero price changes, where Gk is the set of time-periods
for which prices were recorded in t and t  k, Ga the set of periods in which the product has
experienced a non-zero price change, and N t h en u m b e ro fe l e m e n t so fag i v e ns e t . N o t et h e
similarity of these statistics, which I call deviance ratios, to the variance ratios popularized by
Cochrane (1988) in non-parametric tests of non-stationarity. These deviance ratios are larger, the
more persistently ˆ pt moves in a given direction, and although they have no structural interpretation,
13Kackmeister (2005), Dutta, Bergen and Levy (2002).
8they can be used, in conjuction with the model to be presented below, to infer the persistence of
marginal cost shocks. The last rows of Table 2 present the average values of this statistic in the
data, at 12- and 24-month horizons. These ratios are close to 1, suggesting that shocks are not too
persistent14.
An alternative measure of persistence is the probability that the next price change will have
the same sign as the current one. As Table 2 reports, these probabilities15 are low (32% and 41%,
respectively), suggesting that shocks that trigger price changes are transitory and price changes
tend to be reversed. Although useful in providing information about the persistence of idiosyncratic
shocks, this alternative statistic will only be used as an “over-identifying” check on the model, as it
is sensitive to the deﬁnition of sales employed to purge data of temporary price cuts.
B. Ex-ante heterogeneity?
One might argue that the distributional features documented above (and in particular, the
large number of small price changes) merely reﬂect ex-ante heterogeneity (in menu costs, volatil-
ity of shocks) across goods or stores in the sample. I test whether this is indeed the case using
variance decompositions in which I gauge the importance of month, product16, and store-speciﬁc
e&ects in explaining the variability of the magnitude and frequency of price changes reported above.
Speciﬁcally, I estimate
ys
it = c + di + ds + dt + es
it,
14Given the short span of AC Nielsen’s price series, deviance ratios are only reported for 12-month horizons in this
data.
15Calculated as an equally weighted average of the probabilities of two consecutive positive/negative price changes.
Equal weights (as opposed to weights based on the long-run probability of a price increase/decrease) are used in order
to account for the upward trend in prices in Dominick’s data. Use of long-run weights results in a probability of
two consecutive price changes in the same direction equal to 46% in Dominick’s data, but this number overstates the
persistence of the price series as 65% of price changes in Dominick’s data are positive.
16The number of non-zero price changes for a given product is small in Dominick’s data in which I have collapsed
the prices of the di&erent stores into a single, chain-wide price. I therefore estimate product-category×manufacturer,
as opposed to individual good e&ects for this dataset.
9where di,d s,d t a r eg o o d ,s t o r e ,a n dm o n t h - s p e c i ﬁ ce &ects and ys
it is the size of price changes,
|log(pist)|, or the duration of price spells that end in a given period. As Table 3 indicates, month
or store-speciﬁc heterogeneity accounts for less than 10% of the variation of the frequency and size
of price changes in the data. Good-speciﬁc e&ects are somewhat more volatile, but nevertheless
responsible for less than 16% of the variation in the sample.
C. Relationship with other evidence
I have documented two salient features of the distribution of price changes in grocery stores
that will prove important in the calibration of the model economy of the next section: (i) a large
number of price changes are small, and (ii) the distribution of price changes is leptokurtic. A
potential objection to these ﬁndings is that they are speciﬁc to the datasets in question. I argue
below that this is not the case.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) report that 40% of price changes are less than 5% in absolute
value in their dataset of BLS-collected price data covering all goods and services used in the con-
struction of the CPI, a dataset in which prices change by 9.5% on average. Kashyap (1995) uses a
dataset of prices for products sold in retail catalogues and also documents that many price changes
are small: 44% of price changes in his dataset are less than 5% in absolute value. The kurtosis of
price changes, conditional on adjustment, is 15.7 in the data and falls to 6.2 if one excludes the top
and bottom 1% of observations17. Kackmeister (2005) presents a histogram of the distribution of
price changes in a dataset of prices in retail stores: one-third of price changes are less than 10% in
absolute value in an environment where the average magnitude of price changes is 20%. It is clear
then that the two features of the data I document above are pervasive in di&erent environments,
and this underscores the necessity of rendering sticky price models consistent with this set of facts.
17These numbers are based on my own calculations using the data published in Kashyap (1995).
103. Evidence of synchronization
The large number of small price changes observed in the micro-price data might lead one
to conclude against state-dependent pricing models. Several extensions to the standard state-
dependent model have been proposed in earlier work in order to render it consistent with the data.
One might assume time-varying adjustment costs, as in Caballero and Engel (1999) or Dotsey, King
and Wolman (1999). Alternatively, as Kashyap (1995) has suggested, one might allow ﬂuctuations
in the degree of market power possessed by ﬁrms, arising from variation in consumer search costs
over time18. In this paper I explore an alternative route. As Lach and Tsiddon (2005) have argued,
an extension of the state-dependent model to a multi-product environment in which ﬁrms have large
average costs of adjusting an entire menu of prices, but small marginal costs of adjusting any given
price, can also generate a large number of small price changes. If interactions in the cost of price
changes across di&erent goods are indeed at play, one should observe that prices within stores adjust
in tandem, and idiosyncratic disturbances explain little of a given product’s adjustment decisions.
I next ask whether within-store synchronization is indeed a feature of the data.
Lach and Tsiddon (1996) provide evidence that stores synchronize price adjustments of var-
ious products using a dataset of prices collected in Israel19. They ﬁnd that the variability (across
stores) of the fraction of products whose prices change in a given period is larger than what would
be expected if price adjustment decisions were independent across goods. I look for evidence of
within-store synchronization using an alternative approach, one that allows me to control the e&ect
of marginal cost disturbances that might be correlated across goods sold in a particular store, and
allows me to quantify the importance of within-store synchronization in determining a given good’s
price adjustment decision. To this end, I estimate a discrete choice model in which I relate the
probability that a store adjusts its price to marginal cost shocks a&ecting the particular product, as
18See also Benabou (1992).
19See also Fisher and Konieczny (2000).
11well as the fraction of other prices that are changed within the store. Because the two sets of data
di&er in nature, I discuss the empirical tests of product synchronization separately.
Dominick’s
Assume that a good’s frictionless optimal price is, (in logs), p	
it = 1cit+2wt+uit,w h e r ecit
is the wholesale price of the good, wt a chain-wide component to the good’s marginal costs (wages,
energy costs, etc.), and uit an unobserved disturbance. With menu costs of price adjustment,
charging p	
it in each period is suboptimal. I assume instead that Dominick’s follows an (S,s)p r i c e
adjustment policy. Let pit be the chain’s actual price and assume that the optimal price adjustment
decision xit is
xit =
T
      z
      Z
1, if p	
it  pi+ >S it
0, if sit 6 p	
it  pi+ 6 Sit
1, if p	
it  pi+ <s it
where 1 denotes a price increase, 1 a price decrease, and 0 lack of adjustment; + i st h ed a t eo ft h e
previous price change, s and S are the adjustment thresholds, allowed to vary across products and
time. Using the optimal price function assumed above, and assuming that the ﬁrm sets a price equal
to its frictionless optimum every time it adjusts: pi+ = 1ci+ + 2wi+ + ui+, this price adjustment
rule can be rewritten as
xt =
T
      z
      Z
1, if 1cit + 2wit + uit >S it
0, if sit 6 1cit + 2wit + uit 6 Sit
1, if 1cit + 2wit + uit <s it
where, say, cit = cit  ci+ is the growth rate of the product’s wholesale price since the previous
12price adjustment20. I assume that uit  N(0,1) as the model’s scale and location are unidentiﬁed.
To test the hypothesis of synchronization, I parameterize the upper and lower thresholds as
linear functions of three measures of within-store synchronization: (i) the fraction of all remaining
goods whose prices change in a given month; (ii) the proportion of price changes in the respective
good-category (recall that data on 29 product categories, ranging from analgesics to toothpastes is
available); as well as (iii) the proportion of prices of goods produced by the manufacturer of the
product in question that changes in a given month21. All these measures of synchronization are
computed based on the adjustment decision of all goods other than i in a given group (otherwise
a simultaneity bias would a&ect our estimates), and I exclude those observations for which any of
these statistics are calculated based on fewer than ﬁve observations in a given period.
These measures of within-store synchronization make intuitive sense. Levy, Dutta, Bergen
and Venable (1998) use a unique store-level dataset for ﬁve supermarket chains and report, in great
detail, the steps undertaken during a price change process. They report that the bulk (60%, or 79
labor-hours per week/store) of the labor e&ort used to adjust prices is spent on price tag changes
and veriﬁcation, of which most time (50-60%) goes into ﬁnding speciﬁc items on shelves. One would
thus expect that economies of scale in changing prices are larger for products located in adjacent
shelves/aisles. In fact, as Levy et. al. report, “The tag changes are done by aisle, where they are
sorted by commodity.” An ideal measure of relevant within-store synchronization would then be
the fraction of prices adjusted in a given aisle, or in the vicinity of a given product. In the absence
of such data, I use the fraction of price changes within a category group, or produced by a given
manufacturer, as these items are usually placed in adjacent locations within the store.
In addition, I allow both the scale and location of the adjustment thresholds to di&er across
months and product-categories, in order to control for heterogeneity across goods/time-periods. I
20Cecchetti (1986) employs a similar (one-sided) model in order to study the price adjustment of magazine prices.
21Identiﬁed based on the ﬁrst 5 digits of the upc code.
13do so by allowing ﬁxed product-category and month e&ects in the two threshold equations22.T h e
speciﬁcation of the threshold equations is therefore:
Sit = Fit#1 + D1,
sit = Fit#2 + D2,
where D1 and D2 are sets of 11 month and 28 product-group dummy variables, and Fit is a vector
of the measures of synchronization discussed above. The multi-product extension of the menu-cost
model predicts that all elements of #1 are negative and those of #2 are positive, i.e., the (S,s)r e g i o n
is expected to narrow down when the proportion of the remaining prices changed within a store
increases, thereby increasing the probability of a price change.
Turning to the equation for the latent variable, 1cit + 2wit + uit, my measure of the
idiosyncratic cost component cit is the wholesale price at which Dominick’s purchases the goods in
its inventory23. I use the hourly wage rate in the retail sector and the energy and food CPIs to
proxy for economy-wide disturbances to a product’s desired price. I also include the duration of a
given price spell as an explanatory variable in the latent variable equation. I do so because of an
asymmetry in the duration of price spells that end with price increases/decreases in the data. Price
spells that end with price increases are shorter than price spells that end in price decreases (3.5
months vs. 4.6 months in the AC Nielsen data, 5.1 months vs. 5.3 months in Dominick’s data24),
22Random e&ects are a more appealing alternative to modeling heterogeneity in non-linear models because of their
computational advantage. I use a ﬁxed e&ects approach instead to guard against the possibility of endogeneity bias.
If prices in a given product-category adjust more frequently than in others, the probability that a given good in this
category adjusts is higher, and so is the fraction of other products that adjust in this group. In practice, however, as
Table 3 reports, there is little ex-ante heterogeneity in the duration of price spells across di&erent product groups in
the data. A random e&ects speciﬁcation implemented using a Butler and Mo^tt (1982) quadrature approach (results
are available from the author upon request), produces hence similar results to those reported in text. Note also that
the incidental parameters problem does not arise here as the number of observations within a group is large: 6000 on
average.
23Wholesale prices are measured imperfectly, as Dominick’s reports an average acquisition cost for items in its
inventory, as opposed to a replacement cost. Given that we work with monthly data, and inventories are usually
replenished more frequently than that in retail stores (inventory/sales ratios are less than 1 at the monthly frequency,
according to Bureau of Census data), this is unlikely to a&ect our results. See Peltzman (1999) for a discussion of this
issue.
24These statistics are calculated for those observations that are used in estimation (those for which measures of
14an asymmetry that presumably arises because some temporary price cuts last more than 4 weeks
and are treated, according to the deﬁnition of sales I employ as regular price changes, even though
they are not. Unaccounted for, this asymmetry can bias the coe^cients of those components of the
chain’s marginal costs that are characterized by trend growth.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4(A.) reports constrained estimates of the speciﬁcation above in
which I exclude the measures of within-store synchronization from the threshold equations. I report
marginal e&ects of changes in the explanatory variables on the probabilities of a price decrease and
a price increase, respectively.
Although statistically signiﬁcant, disturbances to a product’s wholesale price and changes in
the wage rate in the retail sector have only a small e&ect on a product’s price adjustment decision25.
A 10% increase in the good’s wholesale price since the previous price adjustment increases the
probability of a price increase by only 1.3% and decreases the probability of a price cut by only
0.8%. Similarly, a 10% increase in the retail wage increases the probability of a price increase by
3.5% and lowers that of a price cut by only 2%. I report, in the table, a goodness-of-ﬁt statistic
used to evaluate the model’s performance. Let ˆ Pit be the probability that a price change occurs,
predicted by the model. Let ˆ ait =1i f ˆ Pit > 0.5, and ˆ ait = 0, otherwise, be the predicted price
adjustment decision. According to this deﬁnition, the model predicts a price adjustment if the
probability of a price change is greater than 50%. The goodness-of-ﬁt statistic employed is the
proportion of price changes in the data explained by the model: Pr(ˆ ait =1 |ait =1 ) ,w h e r ea is
the actual adjustment decision. As the table reports, the model explains none of the observed
price changes in the data, reinforcing our conclusion that marginal cost shocks alone cannot explain
Dominick’s price adjustment decisions.
within-store synchronization can be computed using data on at least 5 observations in a given period).
25Although included in all speciﬁcations, I do not report the e&ect of changes in the food and energy CPIs as their
e&ect is statistically insigniﬁcant.
15I allow next (column II of Table 4(A.)) the good-speciﬁc thresholds to vary with the three
measures of within-store synchronization. Note ﬁrst that there is little evidence of store-wide syn-
chronization of the prices of di&erent goods: the estimated marginal e&ects are close to 0. In contrast,
prices of goods in a given product or manufacturer category do tend to adjust in tandem. An increase
in the fraction of remaining prices that change in a given product category from 0 to 1 increases
the probability that a given product will experience a price cut by 5% and that a price increase by
29%, thereby increasing the probability of a price change by 34%. Synchronization is even stronger
for goods in a given manufacturer category. An increase in the fraction of price changes of the
remaining goods produced by a given manufacturer from 0 to 1 increases the probability that the
good in question will also adjust by 55%. The goodness-of-ﬁt statistic increases considerably once
measures of within-store synchronization are accounted for: the model now correctly explains 17%
of the actual price changes observed in the data. In fact, these results provide only a lower bound
of the importance of within-store synchronization. As discussed earlier, I work with Dominick’s
chain-wide price series, deﬁned for each good as the price of the store with the least number of
missing observations. To the extent to which stores enjoy some freedom in the regular price they
charge, results would have been even stronger if data on a single store’s price would have been used
to calculate measures of within-store synchronization.
AC Nielsen
An advantage of this second source of price data is the presence of an additional dimension,
as observations on the prices of goods within, but also across, 31 di&erent stores are now avail-
able. Let i index goods, s stores and t time-periods. The measures of synchronization I employ
are (i) the fraction of a particular good’s prices changed by other stores in period t (across-store
synchronization); (ii) the fraction of remaining prices that change in store s (within-store synchro-
nization); as well as (iii) the proportion of price changes within a good-category in a given store. All
16these statistics are again computed excluding the decision of the good/store whose price adjustment
is modeled. Moreover, because some of the stores in the data belong to a single chain, I compute
measures of across-store synchronization for stores other than those in the chain a particular store
belongs to26.
Information on wholesale prices is unavailable for the AC Nielsen data. I use instead the
average price of the store’s competitors (excluding again those stores that belong to a particular
chain) as a measure of good-speciﬁc disturbances to the marginal cost of selling a product. Results
of speciﬁcations similar to those discussed above are reported in Table 4(B.).
As the table indicates, the conclusions obtained in the case of Dominick’s data carry through
to this sample as well. Changes in the average competitors’ prices and aggregate marginal cost
disturbances again explain none of the adjustment decisions. An increase in the average price of
other stores by 10% only increases the probability of a price increase by 4%. Similarly, a 10%
increase in the wage in the retail sector only increases the probability of a price increase by 17%.
In contrast, the model’s performance improves considerably when measures of synchronization are
included in the threshold equations.
As in the case of Dominick’s data the fraction of price changes within the entire store has
little e&ect on a given product’s adjustment decision. In contrast, synchronization within a product-
category is important: an increase in the fraction of adjusters within a product-category from 0 to
1 increases the probability that a given product will also experience a price cut by 34%, and a price
increase by 62%. The goodness-of-ﬁt statistic improves considerably: the model correctly predicts
22.5% of the price changes observed in the data. Finally, the data provides evidence of minor, but
statistically signiﬁcant, across-store synchronization: an increase in the fraction of other stores that
adjust a particular product’s price from 0 to 1 increases the probability that a given store will also
26I do not calculate the fraction of products belonging to a given manufacturer whose prices change in a given period
as only 115 goods are present in this dataset and too few goods per manufacturer are available.
17adjust the price of this good, albeit by only 4%. I thus conclude that the result that products within
a good-category synchronize is not merely driven by aggregate or good-speciﬁc demand or marginal
cost disturbances (these would lead other stores to also adjust prices), or store-speciﬁc shocks (all
prices of a particular store would adjust in tandem if this were the case).
These empirical results do not, on their own, provide evidence to support the hypothesis that
stores in our data face increasing returns to scale in their price adjustment technology: within-store
synchronization can also arise in the presence of interactions in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function between the
prices of various goods, as in the model of Sheshinski and Weiss (1992). This alternative source of
synchronization is more di^cult to reconcile, however, with the large number of small price changes
observed in the data. As will become clear below, any source of interactions in a multi-product
ﬁrm’s proﬁt function will, as long as it can generate a substantial number of small price changes,
deliver implications similar to those of the model in the next section.
4. A Multi-Product State-Dependent Pricing Model
A. Model Economy
Throughout, let st denote the event realized at time t, st = {s0,s 1,...,s t} the history of events
up to this period and $(st) the probability of a particular history as of time 0. The economy is
populated by a continuum of consumers and a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, both
of mass 1. Consumers are identical, while ﬁrms (indexed by z)d i &er according to their productivity
level, and hence the prices they charge for otherwise identical products. Each ﬁrm sells two products,
indexed by 1 and 2. I ﬁrst discuss the problem of the representative consumer, that of the ﬁrm, and
then deﬁne an equilibrium for this model economy.
Consumers
Consumers’ preferences are deﬁned over leisure and a continuum of imperfectly substitutable
goods. The consumer sells part of her time endowment to the labor market and invests her wealth in
18one-period shares in ﬁrms. In equilibrium, identical consumers own equal shares of all the economy’s
ﬁrms. The representative consumer’s problem is to choose, given prices, how to allocate her income
across the di&erent goods available for consumption and how much to work:
max
{c1(z;st),c2(z;st)},n(st),b
  P
t=0
#t P
st
$(st)U(c(st),n(st)),
subject to
1 R
0
£
p1(z,st)c1(z,st)+p2(z,st)c2(z,st)
¤
dz = w(st)n(st)+(st),
where
c(st)=
μ 1 R
0
³
c1(z,st)
1
 + c2(z,st)
1

´
dz
¶ 
1
is an aggregator over the di&erent varieties of goods that the household consumers, n(st) is the supply
of labor, w(st) the nominal wage rate, (st) the proﬁts the consumer receives from her ownership of
ﬁrms, p1(z,st)a n dp2(z,st) are the prices of each good and  is the elasticity of substitution across
goods. Notice that I have assumed that the elasticity of substitution across goods sold by a single
ﬁrm is equal to the elasticity of substitution across goods sold by di&erent ﬁrms.
Firms
Firms produce output using a technology linear in labor:
yi(z,st)=*i(z,st)li(z,st), i =1 ,2,
where the ﬁrm’s technology, *i(z,st), evolves according to
log*i(z,st)='log*i(z,st1)+i(z,st), i =1 ,2,
and (z,st) ; [min,max] is a random variable, uncorrelated across ﬁrms, goods and time-periods.
Firms operate along their consumers’ demand schedules, derived as solutions to the consumer’s
problem discussed above:
19ci(z,st)=
³
pi(z,st)
P(st)
´
c(st),
where P(st) is the price index in this economy, deﬁned as a consumption-weighted average of the
prices in this economy:
P(st)=
μ 1 R
0
£
p1
t(z,st)1 + p2
t(z,st)1¤
dz
¶ 1
1
.
I assume that ﬁrms face ﬁxed menu costs of resetting prices. Any time at least one (or both) of the
two prices change, the ﬁrm must hire  additional units of labor. Let q(st)=#t Uc(c(st),n(st))
Uc(c(s0),n(s0)), where
Uc is the marginal utility of consumption, denote the t-period stochastic discount factor. The ﬁrm’s
problem is to maximize
  P
t=0
P
st
$(st)q(st)(z,st),
where
(z,st)=
P
i=1,2
³
pi(z,st)
P(st)
´ ³
pi(z,st)
P(st) 
w(st)
*i(z,st)P(st)
´
c(st)

w(st)
P(st)Ip1(z,st)6=p1(z,st1) or p2(z,st)6=p2(z,st1),
and I is an indicator function. The last term of this expression is the increase in the ﬁrm’s wage
bill if it decides to adjust any of its two prices.
B. Equilibrium
I introduce money by assuming that nominal spending must be equal to the money stock27:
1 R
0
P
i=1,2
pi(z,st)ci(z,st)dz = M(st)
The money supply growth rate g(st)=
M(st)
M(st1) evolves over time according to an AR(1) process:
logg(st)=& logg(st1)+(st),
27See Rotemberg (1987) for a transaction technology that gives rise to this particular speciﬁcation of money demand.
20where  is an iid N(0,2
) disturbance.
The equilibrium is a collection of prices and allocations: pi(z,st),w(st),P(st),c i(z,st),c(st),
n(st),l i ¡
z,st¢
,yi(z,st) such that, taking prices as given, consumer and ﬁrm allocations, as well as
ﬁrm prices solve the consumer and ﬁrm problems, respectively, and the labor, goods, and money
markets clear.
C. Computing the Equilibrium
I normalize all nominal variables by the money stock in the economy, e.g., ˜ P(st)=
P(st)
M(st), in
order to render the state-space of this problem bounded. Let ˜ pi
1(z,st)=
˜ pi(z,st1)
M(st) ; P be a ﬁrm’s
(normalized) last period’s price and 	 =[min
1', max
1' ] the support of the distribution of technology
levels in the economy. The aggregate state of this economy is an inﬁnite-dimensional object, con-
sisting of the growth rate of money: g(st), but also of the endogenously varying joint distribution of
last period’s ﬁrm prices and technology levels. Let μ : P2×	2  [0,1] denote this distribution and
 it’s law of motion: μ0 = (g,μ). Finally, let * =( *1,*2) be a vector of a ﬁrm’s technology levels
and p1=
¡
˜ p1
1, ˜ p2
1
¢
collect the ﬁrm’s last period’s nominal prices.
Let V a(*;g,μ)a n dV n(p1,*;g,μ) denote a ﬁrm’s value of adjusting and not adjusting
its nominal prices, as a function of its last period’s prices and current technology, as well as the
aggregate state of the economy. These two functions satisfy the following system of functional
equations:
V a(*;g,μ)=m a x
p
C
H
X
i=1,2
μ
˜ pi
˜ P

˜ w
*i ˜ P
¶μ
˜ pi
˜ P
¶
c  
˜ w
˜ P
+ #
Z
Uc0
Uc
V (p0
1,*0;g0,μ0)dF(1,2,)
I
O
V n ¡
p1,*0;g,μ
¢
=
X
i=1,2
μ
˜ pi
1
˜ P

˜ w
*i ˜ P
¶μ
˜ pi
1
˜ P
¶
c + #
Z
Uc0
Uc
V (p0
1,*0;g0,μ0)dF(1,2,),
where V =m a x ( V a,Vn) is the ﬁrm’s value function and p is a vector of nominal prices the ﬁrm
chooses every time it adjusts. The laws of motion for the state variables are:
21μ0 = (g,μ),*i0 = *i' exp
¡
i¢
,g0 = g& exp()
˜ pi0
1 =
T
  z
  Z
˜ pi
g if adjust
˜ pi
1
g otherwise
Note that ˜ w, ˜ P,care functions of the aggregate state as well, i.e., ˜ w =˜ w(g,μ) etc., although
I do not explicitly indicate this dependence in order to conserve on space. The unknowns in this
problem are the following functions: V a(),Vn(),c(), ˜ w(), ˜ P(),(). To solve this system of functional
equations, I (i) approximate the inﬁnite-dimensional distribution μ with a small number of its
moments, following the suggestion of Krusell and Smith (1997); (ii) replace the unknown functions
with a linear combination of orthogonal polynomials; and (iii) solve for the unknown coe^cients on
these polynomials by requiring that the system of six functional equations (the Bellman equations,
as well as the equilibrium conditions) be exactly satisﬁed at a ﬁnite number of nodes along the
state-space. A technical appendix discusses the solution method in more detail.
5. Quantitative Results
A. Calibration and Parametrization
I parameterize the utility function as
U(c,n)=l o g ( c)  n.
This speciﬁcation follows Hansen (1985) by assuming indivisible labor decisions implemented
with lotteries. I set the length of the period to one month, and therefore choose a discount factor
# = .997. Ic h o o s e to ensure that in the absence of aggregate shocks households supply 1/3 of their
time to the labor markets. To calibrate the process characterizing the growth rate of the money
supply, I estimate an AR(1) process for the growth rate of M1 for the US economy for 1985-1997,
the years for which the micro-price data used to calibrate the model is available.
I next discuss the choice of , the elasticity of substitution across varieties. It has been
widely documented that price-cost margins are large in the retail industry. Nevo (2001) uses a
22structural econometric model in order to estimate demand elasticities for ready-to-eat cereals sold
in a representative sample of supermarkets. His estimates of markup ratios range from 1.4 to 2.
Barsky et. al. (2000) use an indirect method to measure markup ratios for Dominick’s products.
They argue that the ratio of the price of a branded product to that of a generic good provides
a lower bound for the markup ratio on nationally branded products. They ﬁnd that these lower
bounds range from 1.4 to 2.1 for most of the categories of products sold by Dominick’s. Chevalier,
Kashyap and Rossi (2003) estimate price elasticities using the quantity and price data for Dominick’s
dataset. Most of their elasticity estimates range between 2 and 4. Based on this evidence, I set
 = 3, implying a markup ratio of 1.5. Table 6 summarizes the choice of parameter values I assign
the model.
The rest of the parameters are calibrated:  —t h es i z eo ft h eﬁ x e dc o s t si n c u r r e db yt h eﬁ r m
when it changes its menu of prices, ' — the parameter that governs the persistence of marginal cost
shocks, as well as the distribution of technology shocks. I choose these parameters in order to match
the salient properties of the micro-price data discussed in Section 2. I target an average duration
of price spells of 4.5 months, an average value for the two datasets; an average size of price changes
of 9%; a standard deviation of price changes of 12%; and a kurtosis of 4.5. I also require that the
model generates 30% ‘small’ (less than one-half of the mean) price changes, as well as a 24-month
‘deviance ratio’ of 1.02. Additional “over-identifying” checks will be used to gauge the persistence
of marginal cost shocks in the data. Table 5 reports the choice of moments used to calibrate the
model economy.
To calibrate the distribution of idiosyncratic technology shocks, I assume that shocks t are
drawn from the following parametric family of distributions:
t =
T
  z
  Z
btmax,w i t h p = 1
2
btmax, with 1  p = 1
2
23where bt is a random variable drawn from a Beta distribution with parameters 
1 and 
2. The
distribution of technology shocks is thus symmetric around zero, and ﬂexible enough to enable the
model to reproduce the distributional features of the data.
B. Results
Benchmark Model
I solve for the unknown parameters: ',,
1,
2,max, by minimizing the sum of squared
log-deviations of the model-generated moments from the six targets in Table 5. The last rows of
Table 6 (the column labeled Benchmark model) reports the calibrated parameter values.
Marginal cost shocks are fairly transitory: ' =0 .5. Firms pay a menu cost equal to 1.2%
of their steady-state labor bill (0.8% of revenue) every time they undergo a new price change, a
number close to that reported by Levy et. al. (1997) in a study of the price adjustment costs of ﬁve
large supermarkets. The distribution of technology shocks is highly leptokurtic, with a kurtosis in
excess of 20 and a variance of 2.7×103 (
1 =0 .05, 
2 =1 .30, max =0 .4).
Before proceeding to analyze the model’s performance, I brieﬂy discuss the consequences of
the assumption that the ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed cost of changing an entire menu of prices, as opposed
to a given price on the menu. Figure 2 plots the ﬁrm’s value of adjusting its price, as well as the
value of inaction, in the (˜ p1
1, ˜ p2
1) space (prices are expressed as log-deviations from the optimum).
Conditional on adjusting and paying the menu cost, the ﬁrm’s value is independent of its last period’s
prices. The value of inaction is falling however as the two prices deviate away from their optima.
The region in the center, in which both prices are close to their optima and the value of inaction is
greater than that of adjustment, deﬁnes the inaction region. The ﬁrm’s adjustment decision thus
depends, in a multi-product setting, on how far both prices are away from their respective optima.
Figure 3 performs a small comparative statics exercise. I illustrate in this ﬁgure the size of
the inaction regions for di&erent values of the productivity level of the ﬁrm. Similar to what Golosov
24and Lucas (2004) ﬁnd, ﬁrms are more willing to adjust their prices in periods when their technology
is higher: ﬁrms prefer to make hay (set optimal prices) while the sun is shining. Note in the left
panel of the ﬁgure that di&erences in productivity levels across the two goods a ﬁrm sells induce
di&erences in the weight a particular good is assigned in an adjustment decision; because the ﬁrst
good is produced with a worse technology, the ﬁrm is willing to tolerate larger deviations of this
good’s price from the optimum than it does for the second product. Finally, note in the ﬁgure why
interactions in the costs of adjusting prices can generate a number of small price changes: as long
as a given product the ﬁrm sells is subject to a large marginal cost disturbance, the ﬁrm will adjust
both prices, independently of how large a price change it desires for the second product.
I next evaluate the model’s performance quantitatively. Note, in Table 5, that the model is
successful at matching the salient properties of the microeconomic data documented in Section 2,
with all model-based moments close to their targets. In particular, the kurtosis of the distribution
of price changes is 4.3, and 33% of price changes are less than 4.4% in absolute value (1
2 the mean
of absolute value of non-zero price changes). The model also does well in matching other, ‘over-
identifying’ restrictions used to infer the accuracy of the estimate of technology shock persistence.
The 12-month deviance ratio is equal to 0.88, a value equal to the average of that in the two datasets
of scanner prices. The fraction of two consecutive price changes in the same direction is greater,
however, in the model (0.52), than in the data (0.37), suggesting that I over-estimate the persistence
of shocks, but this statistic is sensitive to the deﬁnition of ‘sales’ employed.
Given the model’s success in matching microeconomic features of the data, I next turn to its
aggregate implications. Table 7 (Benchmark, SDP column) reports the volatility and persistence
of HP-ﬁltered output in simulations of the model. For comparison, I also solve a Calvo-type time-
dependent model, identical in all respects to the original model, in which the timing of price changes
is outside the control of the ﬁrm. The multi-product, menu-costs setup generates business cycle
25ﬂuctuations from monetary disturbances almost as large as those in the time-dependent model: the
standard deviation of output is equal to 0.61% (0.75% in the Calvo setup). Business cycles are
equally persistent in the two models: the autocorrelation of output is equal to 0.94.
Standard State-Dependent Pricing Model
I next compare the results above to those one obtains in a standard menu cost economy28
with idiosyncratic marginal cost disturbances. I abstain from the multi-product features discussed
earlier and assume that single-product ﬁrms face ﬁxed costs of adjusting their prices. I assume,
in addition, as is standard in earlier work, that the ﬁrm’s technology shocks, t, are drawn from a
Gaussian distribution29 with mean 0 and variance 2. Three parameters must be calibrated in this
model: ,',2. Is e t' equal to 0.5, as in the benchmark model30. The other two parameters are
jointly chosen so that the frequency of price changes, and the mean absolute value of non-zero price
changes are equal to those in the data: ( =0 .96% of the SS labor bill, 2 =2 .2 × 103).
As the third column (Standard SD) of Table 5 indicates, the standard menu cost model fails
to accord with the micro-price data along two dimensions: it generates no small price changes (no
price change is less than 4.5% in absolute value) and produces a kurtosis of price changes much
smaller than that in the data (1.3). I plot, in Figure 4, the distribution of price changes, conditional
on adjustment, implied by the standard model, as well as the multi-product model calibrated above.
In contrast to the multi-product model, which produces a unimodal, leptokurtic distribution of price
changes, similar to that observed in the data, the standard model generates a bi-modal distribution,
with no price changes close to zero, clearly failing to capture higher-order moments of the data.
The aggregate performance of the standard model, is, as a result of its inability to accord
with the micro-economic evidence regarding the distribution of non-zero price changes, lackluster
28As exposited, for example, in Golosov and Lucas (2004).
29Similar results obtain if we were to assume uniformly distributed shocks. See Gertler and Leahy (2005).
30The results we are about to report are insensitive to how persistent technology shocks are.
26at best. The model generates output ﬂuctuations that are 5 times less volatile than those in a time-
dependent model (the standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered output is only 0.15%, compared to 0.73%
in a Calvo model). Business cycles are also less persistent (an autocorrelation of only 0.75) than
in the time-dependent model. These results accord to those of Golosov and Lucas (2004), Caplin
and Spulber (1986), and Gertler and Leahy (2005), who ﬁnd that standard state-dependent models
generate, despite nominal rigidities at the ﬁrm level, small (if any) business cycle ﬂuctuations from
monetary disturbances.
C. Counterfactual Experiments
Two features of the standard menu-cost model are responsible for its inability to produce
business cycle ﬂuctuations. First, as illustrated by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), ﬁrms synchro-
nize price changes in response to large aggregate shocks and render the aggregate price level more
ﬂexible than in time-dependent economies. Second, the identity of adjusters also varies endoge-
nously in response to nominal disturbances. In times of, say, a monetary expansion, ﬁrms are more
likely to adjust if their idiosyncratic disturbances also call for price increases and reinforce the de-
sire to reprice stemming from the aggregate shock. Because the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks,
conditional on adjustment, varies in response to aggregate disturbances, the response of the price
level to a money shock is ampliﬁed in menu-cost models relative to time-dependent economies31.
I quantify the role of synchronization and self-selection using counterfactual experiments in
which I shut down each of these two e&ects. In the ﬁrst experiment I assume that, conditional on
adjustment, ﬁrms price using the policy rules that are optimal in a state-dependent world. Instead of
allowing them to endogenously choose the timing of their price changes, I select a constant fraction
of ﬁrms to adjust prices, in an iid fashion, following the timing assumption of a Calvo model. I
31This second mechanism is similar to the one that arises in regression equations in which the sample is non-random:
failure to deal with sample selection leads to biased estimates of ordinary least squares estimates.
27aggregate ﬁrm decision rules according to the equilibrium conditions in order to generate time-series
of aggregate prices and quantities. This counterfactual, by holding constant the fraction and identity
of the adjusting ﬁrms, allows us to gauge the combined role of ﬁrm synchronization and self-selection
in reducing output variability in menu cost models.
Note in Table 7 that the standard deviation of output in this counterfactual is 2.1 times
larger than in the original Benchmark model with multi-product ﬁrms. In contrast, shutting down
synchronization and self-selection in the standard single-product model generates output ﬂuctuates
that are 9 times larger than originally. Clearly, synchronization/self-selection has a much stronger
e&ect in the standard menu-costs models than in a model with multi-product ﬁrms and disturbances
su^ciently leptokurtic to match the distribution of price changes observed in the data.
I next solve a second counterfactual, in order to pinpoint the exact source of the monetary
neutrality in the standard SDP model. If synchronization is the sole reason behind the lack of
output variability in the state-dependent model, we would expect that a counterfactual simulation
i nw h i c hw es h u td o w nt h es e l f - s e l e c t i o ne &ect (by selecting adjusters in an exogenous fashion), but
turn on the synchronization e&ect (by allowing the fraction of adjusters to vary endogenously, as
in the original model) to produce as little output variability as in the original menu-cost models.
As Table 7 indicates however, this is not the case. Allowing the fraction of adjusters to vary in
response to aggregate shocks produces almost as much variability of output as in the previous
counterfactual. This suggests that synchronization plays a small role and most of the standard
model’s weak macroeconomic performance is due to variation in the identity of adjusters in response
to aggregate disturbances. This is not surprising, since as Golosov and Lucas (2004) show, most of
the adjustment in models with large marginal cost shocks is driven by idiosyncratic disturbances
and there is little synchronization in response to aggregate shocks.
To understand why self-selection plays a much more important role in the standard model
28(output variability would have been 8.6 times higher in its absence) than in the multi-product model
(where it only reduces the volatility of output in half), consider the heuristic example in Figure 5.
I assume, in the left panel of the ﬁgure, that technology shocks are drawn from a Gaussian density,
and, in the right panel, the leptokurtic density calibrated in the benchmark model. Suppose, for
simplicity, that the (S,s) bands of price adjustment are symmetric and ﬁrms adjust prices whenever
they desire price changes greater than 10%. In the absence of aggregate shocks, only those ﬁrms
whose technology shocks exceed 10% in absolute value will ﬁnd it optimal to adjust their prices.
The inaction region (in the t space) is therefore [s0 = 0.1, S0 =0 .1], illustrated with solid lines
in the two panels of Figure 5.
Consider next the e&ect of a monetary expansion that increases all ﬁrms’ desired prices by 5%.
This aggregate disturbance changes the range of technology shocks for which ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal
to pay the menu costs from [s0 = 0.1, S0 =0 . 1 ]t o[ shigh = 0.05, Shigh = 0.15]. Consider for
example, a ﬁrm whose technology shock is t = 0.07. In the absence of an aggregate disturbance,
this shock is, on its own, too small to trigger an adjustment as it only generates a desired price
increase of 7%. Combined with an additional 5% desired price increase stemming from the monetary
shock, the ﬁrm’s desired price increase is 12%, large enough to force a price change.
The e&ect aggregate shocks have on the identity of adjusters depends however on the kur-
tosis of the distribution of technology shocks. When the distribution is Gaussian, the measure of
‘marginal’ ﬁrms whose adjustment decision is a&ected by the aggregate shock is large (the shaded
area in the ﬁgure). In contrast, when the distribution is leptokurtic, technology shocks that trigger
adjustment are spread further away from the (S,s) bands and aggregate shocks have a small e&ect
on the identity of adjusters.
Gertler and Leahy (2005) illustrate a similar point using a state-dependent model in which
technology shocks a&ect, in a given period, only a fraction of ﬁrms in the economy: the slope of
29the Phillips curve that their model generates depends on the fraction of ﬁrms that are subject to
technology disturbances in a given period, or in our language, the kurtosis of technology shocks in
the economy. The discussion above should also make it clear that one can render the state-dependent
model’s business cycle ﬂuctuations as large as those of a time-dependent model by increasing the
kurtosis of the distribution of technology shocks. If technology shocks were, say, drawn from a three
point distribution and were either equal to zero, or extremely large in absolute value, ﬁrms subject
to non-zero technology disturbances would always adjust, and the model would behave similar to
aC a l v om o d e l 32. Such a parametrization would, however, generate a distribution of price changes
inconsistent with that observed in the data.
Note however that self-selection, although muted in a model with leptokurtic marginal cost
disturbances, still plays an important role in the Benchmark model and reduces the volatility of
output in half. Why then, does the state-dependent model produce business cycle ﬂuctuations that
are of similar magnitude as those in the Calvo model where this e&ect is entirely absent?
The explanation lies in a feature of state-dependent models that has not been, to my knowl-
edge, quantitatively explored in earlier work. If shocks to the growth rate of the money supply are,
as in the data, persistent, a monetary expansion today forecasts additional increases of the money
stock in future periods. Forward-looking ﬁrms take into account these forecasts and respond much
stronger to the nominal shock than they would in a ﬂexible-price world. Several devices have been
proposed to remedy this problem: assuming that a fraction of ﬁrms is backward looking and behaves
suboptimally, automatic indexation of prices to last period’s inﬂation rate, ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors of
production or non-constant elasticities of demand. It turns out however that front-loading in re-
sponse to future expected marginal cost disturbances is mainly a feature of time-dependent sticky
32T h i si so fc o u r s e ,o n l yt r u ei ss h o c k sa r et r a n s i t o r y ,o ra tl e a s tn o tt o op e r s i s t e n t ,a si ti st h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
technology, rather than the shock itself, that matters for the ﬁrm’s price adjustment decision.
30price models, and plays a much smaller role when the timing of price changes is endogenous33.
Figure 6 plots the price functions, conditional on adjustment, in the Calvo and menu-cost
models, expressed as log-deviations of the optimal price from the one that ﬁrms would set in a
ﬂexible price world in which prices would respond one-for-one to the monetary disturbance. Clearly,
Calvo ﬁrms front-load current prices much more aggressively in response to future expected increases
in the money supply than state-dependent ﬁrms do: a 3% increase in the money growth rate triggers
a price increase by Calvo ﬁrms that is almost 5% larger than what is optimal in a ﬂexible price
world. In contrast, the state-dependent ﬁrm’s price increases by only 1%.
To understand why state-dependent ﬁrms refuse to front-load prices, even though they expect
future increases in the growth rate of the money supply, consider Figure 7 in which I plot the two
types of ﬁrms’ values of adjustment and inaction, as a function of one of the two goods’ past prices.
Note two features of this ﬁgure. First, a ﬁrm’s value is higher under state-dependent pricing because
a state-dependent ﬁrm, although it adjusts as infrequently as a time-dependent ﬁrm, chooses the
timing of its price changes optimally. More importantly, a state-dependent ﬁrm’s value of inaction is
much less sensitive to deviations of the past price from the optimum than is the value of inaction of a
Calvo ﬁrm. This result makes intuitive sense. If a state-dependent ﬁrm ﬁnds itself with a suboptimal
price in a given period, it can always exercise its option to adjust. Its losses are therefore bounded
by the size of the menu cost. In contrast, a time-dependent ﬁrm pays a hefty price every time
its nominal price is suboptimal: because it has to wait for an exogenously ﬁxed number of periods
before it gets to reset its price, it will incur much larger losses from a suboptimal price relative to
what a state-dependent ﬁrm would. A time-dependent ﬁrm’s incentive to o&set future deviations of
its price from the optimum is therefore larger than that of a state-dependent ﬁrm and it adjusts
33Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) point out this di&erence in the optimal price functions of time- and state-
dependent ﬁrms, but ﬁnd it quantitatively small in their baseline parametrization with no serial correlation in the
growth rate of the money supply and time-varying costs of price adjustment.
31more aggressively in response to persistent shocks to the growth rate of the money supply.
D. Leptokurtic Shocks or Multi-Product Firms?
I ﬁnally isolate the role of the two departures from the standard menu costs model I have
introduced and evaluate the contribution of each in improving the model’s macroeconomic perfor-
mance. I ﬁrst solve a model with economies of scale in the costs of price adjustments, in which
idiosyncratic shocks are drawn from a Gaussian distribution. The only parameter I calibrate is the
size of the menu costs, chosen to ensure the same frequency of price changes as in the Benchmark
model. The rest of the parameters are set equal to their calibrated values in the Benchmark model.
Notice in the 4th column of Table 5 that the model fails to match the kurtosis of the distribution of
price changes in the data, although it does generate a large number of small price changes (26%)34.
A departure from the assumption of Gaussian shocks is therefore crucial in reproducing the kurtosis
of the distribution of technology shocks in the data. Table 7 presents this model’s aggregate impli-
cations: although the volatility of output increases relative to that in models with no interactions in
the costs of price adjustment (0.25% vs. 0.15%), business cycle ﬂuctuations are much smaller than
those in time-dependent models. The reason the model’s performance does improve is a weakening
of the selection e&ect, which, as the counterfactual experiments indicate, is almost twice weaker
than in the standard single-product economy.
I next solve the problem of a single-product ﬁrm in which technology shocks are drawn from
the distribution assumed in the Benchmark model. Leptokurtic shocks are capable, on their own, to
reproduce the kurtosis of price changes in the data. They fail to generate however a large number of
small price changes: only 4% of price changes are now less than 4.5% in absolute value. As Table 7
indicates, leptokurtic shocks increase the volatility of output from 0.15% in the Standard model to
34I deﬁne, here and in the next calibration, a small price change as a price change whose absolute value is less than
4.5%, the average magnitude of price changes in the Benchmark model.
320.46%, a signiﬁcant improvement, albeit smaller than in the Benchmark model. Both interactions
in the costs of price adjustment, as well as leptokurtic shocks are thus a necessary ingredient of
a model capable of reproducing the microeconomic evidence and generating sizable business cycle
ﬂuctuations.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that standard state-dependent pricing models are inconsistent with
two facts regarding the behavior of individual good’s prices: the large number of small price changes
and excess kurtosis of price changes in the data. The large number of small price changes can
be reconciled with state-dependent models if multi-product ﬁrms face interactions in the costs
of adjusting prices: I ﬁnd indeed substantial evidence that prices of products in narrow product
categories within grocery stores adjust in tandem.
I then study the general equilibrium properties of a multi-product menu-cost economy cali-
brated to accord with this micro-economic evidence, and ﬁnd that the model can, in fact, generate
substantial business cycle ﬂuctuations from nominal disturbances. A key feature of the calibration,
the leptokurtic distribution of idiosyncratic disturbances, implies, together with the assumption of
economies of scale in the price adjustment technology, that the selection e&e c tt h a tp l a y sa ni m p o r -
tant role in standard menu cost economies is much weaker in this setup. This, as well as the fact
that state-dependent pricing ﬁrms are less willing to front-load prices in response to expected future
changes in the stock of the money supply, ensures that a menu-cost model can generate substantial
output variability from monetary disturbances.
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A. Construction of Price Series
AC Nielsen
I use the household-level data to construct weekly price series according to the following
algorithm. For each store/good in the sample, I calculate the number (if any) of units sold at a
particular price during the course of the week. If the store sells the product at a single price during
the week, I assign this value to the weekly price series. If more than one price is available, the
weekly price is the price at which the store sold the largest number of units. In case of a tie in the
number of units sold at a particular price, the weekly price is the highest price at which the store
sells in a given week1.
Given that I use scanner price data, price observations for a particular store/good are only
available when a customer purchases the product in a particular week. The original prices series
are therefore frequently interrupted by gaps. I ignore the gaps if these last for four weeks or less,
and use the latest available price before the gap to ﬁll in the price series. Because I study the
frequency and size of price changes, I require an uninterrupted prices series. If gaps larger than four
weeks are present in the data, I keep only the longest spell of uninterrupted price observations, and
discard the rest. The original dataset has observations for 124 weeks, 38 stores, and 225 products,
but many of these series have a large number of missing observations. To ensure that I work with
a more balanced panel, I discard the ﬁrst 6 and last 5 weeks of the data in which the number of
products available is small (less than 60 on average across stores). I also discard goods for which
fewer than 10 stores (one-fourth of the original number of stores) have price data at least two-third
of the time. Finally, I discard stores for which fewer than 30 products (one-fourth of the number of
products that make the cuto& above) are non-missing at least two-third of the time. The resulting
sample is one with 113 weeks of data on prices of 115 products in 31 stores.
1Intuitively, if the number of units sold at two prices is equal, the highest price is likely to have been in e&ect for
a longer time-period as consumers are more likely to buy at the lowest price.
1Dominick’s
The Kilts Center for Marketing makes available weekly price quotes for 86 of Dominick’s
stores. As noted above, this dataset is a by-product of a series of randomized pricing experiments
conducted by Dominick’s from 1992 to 1993. I only work with the prices of those stores/product
categories that were part of control groups in order to avoid treating price changes arising due to
experiments as regular price changes2.
Dominick’s stores are divided into three groups: high, low and medium-price stores, depending
on the extent of local competition. Prices within, but also across groups, are strongly correlated, as
Dominick’s sets prices on a chain-wide basis3. Given that gaps in prices are a common occurrence
for this dataset, I collapse store-wide prices into a single, chain-wide price, in order to reduce the
number of missing observations. I work with medium-price stores only, as these account for the
largest share of Dominick’s stores. From this set of observations, I let the chain-wide price be the
price of the store that has the largest number of observations4. For each gap present in this series, I
ﬁll in the gaps with the price of another store in the chain, whose pricing most closely resembles the
price of the original store, provided that data for this store is available during this period, and the
two store’s prices coincide in the periods immediately before and after the gap5.M ym e t r i co ft h e
similarity of two stores’ price policies is the number of periods in which the two stores set identical
prices for a given product. On average 1% of price series are imputed using another store’s price.
The prices of the stores used to ﬁll in missing data coincide with the price of the original store in
an average of 96% of time periods for which data on both stores is available. I discard from the
sample those goods for which less than 100 uninterrupted weekly observations are available (4979
2Hoch, Dreze and Purk (1994) discuss Dominick’s experiment in detail.
3See Peltzman (2000) for a discussion of Dominick’s pricing practices.
4Prior to this step, I eliminate gaps smaller than 4 weeks following the algorithm used for the AC Nielsen data.
5This last constraint is dictated by our unwillingness to confound changes in stores with changes in the price of a
particular store.
2out of the original 5700 goods make this cuto&).
B. Time-Aggregation and Treatment of Sales
Retail prices are characterized by a large number of temporary price markdowns (sales).
Kackmeister (2005) reports that 40% of price changes arise due to sales in a dataset of forty-eight
products sold in retail stores during 1997-1999. Hosken and Rei&en (2004) ﬁnd that 60% of the price
decreases in their sample of twenty products sold in 30 locations during 1988-1997 are followed by a
price increase in the following month. Several hypothesis have been advanced to explain this pattern
of retail price variation, stressing informational frictions on consumer’s side of the market (Varian
1980), demand uncertainty (Lazear 1986), or thick-market explanations (Warren and Barsky, 1995),
to name a few. Instead of incorporating one (or more) of these explanations into the model economy,
I follow Golosov and Lucas (2004) and ﬁlter out temporary price sales from the price series. This
decision leads me to overestimate the importance of nominal rigidities, as I artiﬁcially increase the
duration of price spells I ask the model to match, but my goal is to compare the performance of two
competing sticky price models, rather than compare the models’ performance to the data.
Although I eventually time-aggregate the weekly data into monthly observations, I ﬁrst ﬁlter
out sales using the original weekly data6. I eliminate sales according to the following algorithm7.
For any price decrease, I check whether this price change is reversed in one of the four weeks
following the original price cut. This deﬁnition eliminates both V-shaped price changes (price
decreases immediately followed by price increases), but also gradual price decreases, provided these
are eventually followed by a price increase after at most four weeks following the ﬁrst price cut. If a
sale is deemed to have taken place, I replace the “sales” price with the price in e&ect in the period
6The alternative choice (of time-aggregating the data ﬁrst and then eliminating sales) can produce spurious price
changes if stores periodically put their prices on sale, at regular intervals.
7Dominick’s dataset includes a “sales” variable that we could in principle use to eliminate temporary markdowns
from our price series. This variable is however coded inconsistently and leaves out many temporary price cuts. I
therefore choose to eliminate sales manually.
3immediately before the sale. Figure A1 (left panel) illustrates how the algorithm works. The thin
line in the ﬁgure is the original price series, while the thick line is the “regular” price. Note for
example that the ﬁrst “sale” was implemented gradually, with the original price decrease followed
by no price change in the ﬁrst week of the “sale”, an additional price decrease in the second week,
and ﬁnally a price increase four weeks after the original sale. The drawback of this deﬁnition is
that it does not eliminate all temporary markdowns in case a price cut is gradually reversed. For
example, the ﬁnal price cut illustrated in the ﬁgure was followed by two consecutive price increases,
and I have artiﬁcially introduced a new “sale” using the algorithm discussed above. To address this
problem I repeat the algorithm above an additional three times, in order to eliminate sales that
have been gradually implemented. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the resulting series of
“regular prices” following the last iteration. Note that a single “regular” price change remains after
all gradual price reversals are taken into account. Although this remaining price decrease is also
reversed, it does not constitute a sale according to our deﬁnition because it lasts more than four
weeks.
Note a ﬁnal issue that will play an important role in our discussion of the size and frequency
of price changes. By eliminating temporary price cuts, I have introduced an artiﬁcial small price
change in the regular price series. Any time temporary price reductions are not completely reversed,
or followed by price changes larger than the original price cut, setting the regular price equal to the
price prior to the sale will artiﬁcially introduce a number of small price changes that are otherwise
absent in the actual price data. Given that a key statistic in the micro-price data I use to calibrate
the menu costs model is the fraction of small price changes in the data, I ignore artiﬁcially generated
price changes arising due to the ﬁltering of sales and only work with those changes in the regular
price that have actually been observed in the original data.
Finally, given that most quantitative studies of sticky price models calibrates them to the
4monthly or quarterly frequency, I assume a period of one month in the model presented in text. I
therefore time-aggregate weekly observations into monthly data, by constructing the monthly series
using price data collected in the ﬁrst week of the month.
5Technical Appendix
The typical approach used in solving state-dependent pricing or inventory models is the
simulation technique suggested by Krusell and Smith (1997) and applied by Willis (2002) and Khan
and Thomas (2004) to models with non-convexities. I depart slightly from the standard method and
use a solution technique free of simulations, one that draws heavily on collocation, a residual-based
functional approximation method discussed at length in Miranda and Fackler (2002). A simulation-
free solution technique used to solve models with heterogeneous agents was originally suggested by
DenHaan (1997) in the context of an uninsurable idiosyncratic risks model.
Recall that the ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize
E0
P 
t=0 #t Uc(ct,nt)
Uc(c0,n0)t(˜ pt,)
where (for simplicity, I discuss the problem of a single-product ﬁrm)
t(˜ pt)=
³
˜ pt
˜ Pt
´ ³
˜ pt
˜ Pt  ˜ wt
*t ˜ Pt
´
ct   ˜ wt
˜ PtI
³
˜ pt 6=
˜ pt1
gt
´
.
In equilibrium, ˜ wt is constant at the steady-state level because of the preference structure
assumed, and ˜ Ptct =1 .The unknown aggregate functions are c(g,μ), aggregate consumption as a
function of the growth rate of the money supply, g and μ, the joint distribution of last period’s ﬁrm
prices and current technology, as well as , the law of motion of μ.
Letting  = {g,μ} denote the aggregate state of the world, one can rewrite the ﬁrm’s problem
recursively as:
V adj(˜ p1,*;)=m a x
˜ p
Uc
μ
(˜ p)  
˜ w
˜ P
¶
+ #EV(˜ p,*0;0)( V 1 )
V nadj(˜ p1,*;)=Uc(˜ p1)+#EV
μ
˜ p1
g
,*0;0
¶
, (V2)
1where V =m a x
©
V adj,Vnadjª
is the ﬁrm’s value, V adj and V nadj is the value of adjustment and not
adjustment, respectively and (˜ p)=
³
˜ p
˜ P
´ ³
˜ p
˜ P  ˜ w
* ˜ P
´
c. μ evolves according to μ0 = (g,μ). The
unknowns in this problem are V adj(), V nadj( ) ,a sw e l la sc() and (). Following Krusell and Smith
(1997), I approximate μ with one moment. In particular, I have found that ˆ μt =
R
˜ pt1(z)*t(z)dz
yields a large degree of accuracy. In the multi-product case μ is the joint distribution of the two
past nominal prices of the ﬁrm. I approximate this distribution once again with its ﬁrst moment:
ˆ μt = 1
2
R P2
i=1 ˜ pi
t1(z)*i
t(z)dz
Given initial guesses for c() and (), I solve the functional equations in (V1-V2) using col-
location. Speciﬁcally, I approximate each of the two value functions using a linear combination of
N Chebyshev polynomials. To solve for the 2N unknown coe^cients, I require that (V1) and (V2)
hold at 2N nodes in the state space. This condition yields 2N equations I use to solve for the
unknown coe^cients. I solve the ﬁrm’s maximization problem in (V1) using a Newton-type routine
and evaluate the expectations on the RHS of the Bellman equation by discretizing the distribution
of shocks and integrating using Gaussian quadrature.
To solve for the aggregate functions c() and (), I replace them with a linear combination of
Chebyshev polynomials and solve for an equilibrium at each node used to discretize the state-space.
For each aggregate node (gi, ˆ μi), I solve the ﬁrm’s problem and recompute aggregate variables ci and
ˆ μ0
i. To calculate these objects, I need to integrate individual ﬁrms’ decision rules. Given that I only
use one moment of the joint distribution of idiosyncratic states, I assume away all variability in p1*
(and also that a ﬁrm’s past prices are independent of each other). I discretize the cross-sectional
distribution of * and calculate, for each mass point in this distribution, the associated p1 consistent
with the assumption that p1* is degenerate at ˆ μi and the law of motion for *t. F o re a c hn o d e{pj,
*j}, I solve ﬁrm decision rules and integrate using Gaussian quadrature. Given aggregate quantities
ci and μi,Ir e t r i e v ean e ws e to fc o e ^cients that characterize aggregate functions. For example,
2letting c be an M × 1 vector of aggregate consumption that satisfy the equilibrium conditions at
each node used to discretize the aggregate state-space, 	 be a M × K matrix of K Chebyshev
polynomials evaluated at the M nodes, I ﬁnd the K unknown coe^cients c by solving 	c = C.
This set of coe^cients for all aggregate variables is used to re-solve the ﬁrm’s problem, obtain a set
of new aggregate variables at each node and calculate a new set of  =[ c,]. I stop when the
di&erence between two successive sets of  is su^ciently low: ||k+1  k||  < 105.
To evaluate the accuracy of this solution method, I plot, in Figure A2, a time-series of
aggregate consumption predicted by the approximant ˆ c(μ,) for a simulation of stochastic forcing
processes, as well as the actual aggregate consumption calculated by integrating ﬁrm decision rules.
I do so for the Benchmark model, the state-dependent setup. Note that the two series are close
to each other: the variability of the actual consumption series explained by the approximant is
94%, suggesting that the additional, higher-order moments that we assume away explain little of
the ﬂuctuations of aggregate variables in simulations of the model economy. Aggregate functions
are even more accurate than the ones illustrated in the ﬁgure in the Calvo and single-product
state-dependent models.
In Figure A2 I ask how accurate are the solutions to the ﬁrm’s problem. I plot the left and
right-hand side of the Bellman equation in V2, holding constant all other state-variables but ˜ p1,a t
a large number of nodes (larger than that used to pin down the coe^cient on the basis functions).
Note that the two value functions (predicted and actual), are close to each other. The di&erence in
the two (the residuals) are, as the right panel of Figure A3 indicates, small in absolute value (less
than 5×103) and oscillate around zero.
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